Abstract-In this paper, we present efficient self-checking implementations valid for all existing adder and arithmatic and logic unit (ALU) schemes (e.g., ripple carry, carry lookahead, skip carry schemes). Among all the known self-checking adder and ALU designs, the parity prediction scheme has the advantage that it requires the minimum hardware overhead for the adder/ALU and the minimum hardware overhead for the other data-path blocks. It also has the advantage to be compatible with memory systems checked by parity codes. The drawback of this scheme is that it is not fault secure for single faults. The scheme proposed in this work has all the advantages of the parity prediction scheme. In addition, the new scheme is totally self-checking for single faults. Thus, the new scheme is substantially better than any other known solution.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
INCE adders and ALUs are essential elements of computers, designing efficient self-checking adders/ALUs is an important challenge in the area of self checking and fault tolerant computers. The first self-checking adders were based on arithmetic residue codes [1] , [2] and were used in the JPL STAR Computer [3] . The parity prediction scheme has been proposed later [4] , [5] and more recently a Berger code prediction scheme has been introduced [6] .
Arithmetic codes are interesting for checking arithmetic circuits since they are preserved under arithmetic operations. In fact, if the operands belong to an arithmetic code the result of an arithmetic operation belong to this code as well (e.g., AX codes in adders), or a simple circuit is required to obtain the code of the result. However, arithmetic codes have also some important drawbacks.
• Arithmetic code checkers are complex circuits.
• Error detection in datapath buses, register files, and shifters can be achieved by using the parity code, but in order to avoid complex code translators these blocks must also be checked by the arithmetic code. This increases the area overhead of the whole datapath. • Many errors due to single faults can be undetectable in carry-lookahead adders checked by arithmetic codes [7] .
• Logic operations do not preserve the arithmetic codes, and the use of such codes in ALUs requires to implement some complex circuits for code prediction.
• Finally, datapaths based on arithmetic codes are compatible neither with self checking memory systems (which use parity encoding), nor with fault-tolerant memory systems (which use Hamming SEC/DED codes). Parity prediction self-checking adders [4] and ALUs [5] have also been proposed. Parity prediction adders require the lower-hardware overhead among all known self checking adder schemes. This scheme is compatible with parity checked datapaths and with parity encoded self checking memory systems. It can also be extended to be compatible with memory systems based on Hamming SEC/DED codes [8] . This scheme detects the single errors produced on the outputs of the adder/ALU. However, a single fault in an adder can produce an error on a carry signal, which can be propagated to several outputs of the adder. Thus, for single faults, the parity prediction scheme does not ensure the so-called fault secure property. This property requires that the checking scheme detects all errors produced on the circuit outputs under any modeled fault affecting the circuit.
Strongly fault secure (SFS) Berger code prediction ALUs have also been proposed [6] . With this scheme, the other datapath blocks are also checked by the Berger code to avoid code translators. Checking these blocks by the Berger code requires higher overhead with respect to the parity code. The checkers are also more complex. Note as well that this scheme is not compatible with parity based self checking memory systems or with fault tolerant memory systems based on Hamming SEC/DED codes.
From this discussion a self-checking adder/ALU is efficient if it reaches the following goals.
• It is totally self checking (TSC) or strongly fault secure (SFS) for single faults.
• It requires low-hardware overhead.
• It is checked by a compact checker.
• It can be combined with parity checked datapaths and memories without using code translators. In this paper, we propose an implementation that reaches all these goals.
The new self-checking design is valid for any ALU and adder scheme (e.g., ripple-carry, group carry-lookahead, full carry-lookahead, skip-carry, conditional sum). It combines double-rail checking of the carries and parity prediction for the outputs, in order to achieve the fault secure property. Combining double-rail checking and parity prediction should result in high-hardware cost. Three hardware reduction techniques were devised to maintain low-hardware cost. The first technique collapses into a single block, the double-rail checker and the parity generator, which are required by the trivial combination of the two schemes. The second avoids the duplication of complex blocks, such as the carry lookahead or the skip carry block, required for performing carry checking. The third achieves this checking by using partial carry duplication. 
II. SELF-CHECKING CIRCUITS
Concurrent error detection verifies the results delivered by a circuit during its normal operation. Concurrent error can be achieved by means of duplication and comparison. However, this technique requires more than 100% hardware overhead. To achieve lower cost, the self-checking design can be adopted.
In the self-checking design, a complex circuit is partitioned into its constituent functional blocks and each of these blocks is implemented according to the structure of Fig. 1 . This structure implements functional blocks delivering outputs belonging to an error detecting code. A checker monitoring this code performs the concurrent error detection.
The desirable goal to be achieved by self-checking circuits is often stated as TSC goal. This goal requires that under any modeled fault, the first erroneous output of the functional block is signaled on the outputs of the checker. To achieve this goal, the functional block must verify some properties. These properties are introduced by Carter [9] and formalized by Anderson [10] .
Fault Secure: Under each modeled fault, the produced erroneous outputs do not belong to the output code.
Another useful property is the self-testing one. Self-Testing: For each modeled fault there is an input vector occurring during normal operation that produces an output vector which do not belong to the output code.
This property avoids the existence of redundant faults. Such faults remain undetectable and could be combined with new faults occurring later in the circuit, resulting in multiple faults that could destroy the fault secure property. Thus, the combination of the fault secure and the self-testing properties (TSC property) offers the highest level of protection.
TSC: The circuit is both fault secure and self-testing. The fault secure property is the most important one, since it guarantees error detection under any single fault, but it is also the most difficult to achieve. The self-testing property can be easily achieved, especially for stuck at faults, where it is enough to remove the redundant faults by simplifying the circuit [11] .
III. PARITY PREDICTION ADDERS/ALUS
The output bit of an adder is equal to . Therefore, by considering modulo2 sums, the output parity is given by the expression (1), where and are the th bits of the operands and and the output vector , is the carry input of slice , , are the parities of the input operands and , and is the parity of the carries.
In a system using parity encoded data, the parities and are already available. Thus, only has to be computed to perform the parity prediction.
can be computed from the normal carries of the adder. However, the parity prediction schemes proposed in the literature usually duplicate the carries. Fig. 2 shows the parity prediction scheme for adders and ALUs. In the case of adders, the block R implements the duplicated carries. This duplication is necessary in order to avoid the undesirable situation where common mode errors affect both the predicted parity and the result . Analysis presented here shows that carry duplication is necessary in parity prediction, since deriving from the normal carries yields a very poor fault detection. In fact, a design where the fault secure property does not hold can be acceptable in many applications as long as the faults are detectable within a certain (preferably short) time duration. For instance, in the case of parity prediction using duplicated carries, a stuck-at fault on carry produces an output error of odd multiplicity for several input vectors. The number of these vectors depends on the position of the faulty carry, but it is always greater than one half of the total number of input vectors. Thus, although errors of even multiplicity are undetectable, the fault detection probability within a clock cycle is higher than 1/2, resulting in a very low detection latency. For example, if we consider uniform distribution of the input vectors, the probability that a fault is not detected within 30 clock cycles is less than 10 .
On the other hand, if for a significant proportion of faults, the fault detection probability is very low, the design will be unacceptable for a majority of applications. This happens when the parity is derived from the normal carries. In this case, the faults affecting the logic generating the carries are never detected, although they involve erroneous results for a large amount of input vectors (e.g., a carry stuck-at fault creates an output error for the half of input vectors). This problem concerns a significant proportion of faults, since the carry logic represents a significant part of the adder/ALU logic. In particular, in fast designs such as carry lookahead and skip-carry adders/ALUs, the carry logic represents the largest part of the circuit. Theorem 1 formally states the problem.
Theorem 1: Deriving from the normal carries results in infinite detection latency for all faults affecting the logic generating the carries alone.
Proof: Suppose a fault that affects the carry generation logic and creates logic erroneous values on the outputs of this logic. Let be the number of erroneous carries produced under an arbitrary input vector. Then, the error on the predicted parity is ( )modulo2. On the other hand, the erroneous carries result in erroneous outputs, since . Therefore, the error on the parity of the actual outputs is also ( )modulo2. Thus, no input vector detects the fault, resulting in infinite detection latency Q.E.D. Note that the parity prediction is very efficient for input faults since it detects all errors produced by any single-input fault. In fact, an error on the input parity or is detected since it always modifies the predicted parity [see (1)], but not the parity of the actual outputs. On the other hand, a single error on an operand (e.g., operand ), results in the situation where the value of does not correspond to the parity of the actual values applied on the inputs of the adder. Thus, the error is detected as for the case of an error on . Parity prediction for ALUs can be implemented similarly to adders. In this case we will use the equations for addition for bit-wise XOR (2) for bit-wise OR (3) and for bit-wise AND (4) [5] . The block R in Fig. 2 , implementing the carry function in the case of adders, has to be modified to satisfy these equations. From these equations, we can easily check that the analysis of error detection is similar as the one presented for adders.
IV. CARRY CHECKING/PARITY PREDICTION ADDERS
The scope of the present work is to derive low-cost fault secure adders and ALUs, which are compatible with parity checked datapaths and memory systems. A basic observation leading to the new scheme is that a single fault in an adder or ALU can be propagated through the carries to create multiple output errors. These errors could be undetectable by the parity code destroying the fault secure property. This observation leads us to the idea of checking the carries in order to detect these errors. As we have seen in the previous section, the parity prediction scheme has also to duplicate the carries, if a reasonable fault detection capability has to be achieved. Our solution only adds a double-rail checker in this scheme in order to check the two copies of the carries and achieve the fault secure property. In fact, we show that the fault secure property holds for the stuck-at fault model, but also for a wider-fault model defined at the level of a circuit module.
Logic-Fault Model of a Circuit Module:
This fault model includes any fault affecting the module, provided that all erroneous values produced at the faulty module outputs are at a logic level.
Considering a single module, the terms "single logic-fault" and "multiple logic-fault" do not make sense, since a fault belongs to this model if the errors on the module outputs are logic, regardless to the number of faulty elements of the module. However, in a circuit including several modules we will use the term "single logic-fault" to specify that only one module can be affected by a logic-fault at a time. Note also, that the stuck-at fault model is a special case of this model, so stuck-at faults will not be discussed explicitly in the rest of this section.
Theorem 2: Combining the parity prediction scheme with a scheme checking the duplicated carries achieves the fault secure property, for all single logic-faults affecting the carry block, the duplicated carry block, or any of the bit slices generating the outputs of the adder.
Proof: For the single logic-faults affecting the modules enumerated in the theorem, the duplicated carry scheme detects all errors propagated through the carries. On the other hand, if no error is propagated through the carries only one output can be affected by the error. This error is detected by the parity prediction.
Q.E.D Thus, the carry checking/parity prediction scheme guaranties the fault secure property. However, the goal of low-hardware cost is not reached yet. The scheme requires to use the following extra logic: a parity generator for predicting the parity; a double-rail checker for checking the carries; a logic generating the duplicated carries (hereafter referred to as check carries). In fast adders and ALUs, such as carry lookahead, skip carry and conditional sum, the carry generation logic is quite large. The following techniques were devised to achieve drastic reduction of hardware cost:
A. Removing the Parity Generator
This reduction is achieved due to the following observation. A well-known property of double-rail checkers is that they have a one-to-one correspondence with the parity trees [10] , [12] . Thus, they can be viewed as parity generators having double-rail inputs and outputs. In fact, they receive several inputs in the double-rail code and generate a pair of double-rail outputs. The output pair computes the parity of the input pairs. Thus, the parity generator can be avoided since the outputs of the double-rail checker will provide the signals and , as illustrated in Fig 3. This simple technique, collapsing into a single block double-rail checkers and parity checkers/generators, has never been used in the past.
B. Avoiding Duplication of Complex Carry Generation Blocks
In fast adders and ALUs, the carry generation logic represents the largest part of the design. Thus, duplicating this part will result in high hardware cost. To reduce this cost the check carries can be generated according to the ripple-carry principle, which requires low cost. However, this solution results in linear delay and is not compatible with the fast adder/ALU designs achieving logarithmic delay. The following solution was used to cope with this problem:
• in order to achieve low hardware cost each check carry is implemented using the same logic as in the carry slices of the ripple-carry adder, • in order to maintain high speed, the carry input of each check carry slice comes from the block generating the normal carries, instead of the previous slice of the check carries. Fig. 3 shows the block diagram of the carry checking/parity prediction adder using the reductions of points A and B. Fig. 4 illustrates the details of slice implementing this solution. We observe that the check carries are implemented by a compact circuit. The use of complex blocks, such as the carry lookahead logic, is avoided. Furthermore, the delay of the check carries is similar to the delay of the adder outputs. In fact, they both receive inputs from the carry generation block and propagate them through two gate levels. Note, however, that this solution merges the logic generating the normal and the check carries. Thus, we have common mode errors (a fault in the block generating the normal carries can be propagated on both the normal and the check carries). It is well know that such errors can escape detection in duplicated schemes. However, the following theorem shows that in the present case all errors are detectable.
Theorem 3: Logic faults affecting the carry generation block of Figs. 3 and 4 and creating common mode errors do not destroy the fault secure property
Proof: Logic faults in the block generating the normal carries can produce errors on both the outputs of this block and on the redundant carries generated for checking purposes (check carries). This situation may destroy the fault secure property. However, if we consider the less significant erroneous output of the carry generation block (say output ), then, the check carry can not be affected by the fault in the carry generation block (since it is generated from , which is correct). Thus, even if both components of the pairs ( ), ( ), …, are erroneous, the error is detected by the comparison of and .
Q.E.D. 
C. Use of Partial Carry Duplication
For further hardware cost reduction, some logic could be shared between the logic generating a check carry and the logic generating the corresponding normal carry. However, this sharing will give the same errors on the check and normal carries, escaping detection by the double-rail checker. Thus, it will be required to detect such errors by means of the parity prediction. From the proof of theorem 1 we observe that i) if the errors affect in the same way the carry signals used in the computation of the circuit outputs and those used for parity prediction and ii) if all errors occurring on the outputs are caused by the propagation of the errors on the carry signals, then, the error is not detected by the parity prediction.
This situation will generally happen if the normal and the check carries share some logic. However, if the logic shared by the th normal and check carries is also used to generate the sum output , then, an error coming from the shared logic can be propagated to this output directly (i.e., without passing through a carry). This invalidates the condition ii) and the error can be detected. In addition, if the error on the shared signal is always propagated to , the error is always detected. This observation leads to the solution of Fig. 5 , where the signal is shared by the normal carry , the check carry and the output . Thus, further hardware cost reduction is obtained. The following theorem formally shows that this sharing does not destroy the fault secure property.
Theorem 4:
The parity prediction detects all the errors produced by a logic-fault affecting the logic generating the signal in Fig. 5 . Proof: Let us consider a fault affecting the logic that generates . This fault will first produce an error on , which can be propagated to several other signals of the circuit. Let this error be propagated on consecutive normal carries. Since , errors will appear on the circuit outputs . Since , the error on is also propagated to . Thus, a total of errors will occur on the outputs. The parity of the actual outputs is modified by the factor ( )modulo2. Since the circuits generating the normal and the check carries implement the same functions, an error on the shared signal will be propagated on the same number of normal and check carries. Thus check carries are erroneous, modifying the predicted parity by the factor ( )modulo2. Since modulo modulo , the parity prediction detects the error.
Q.E.D. As we can observe in Fig. 5 , only a small amount of logic has to be added to the adder for generating the check carry , (one four-input AND-OR) resulting in a low-cost fault secure design.
V. CARRY CHECKING/PARITY PREDICTION ALUS
ALUs can be realized by using separate blocks to implement the adder and the various logic functions. Several control signals select the function to be performed by means of a multiplexer inserted into each bit slice of the ALU. A more compact solution modifies the function of the propagate and generate signals in a manner that allows the computation of all functions within a single block. In this section, we consider the implementation of self-checking ALUs based on this principle. The bit slice of a compact ripple-carry ALU performing addition, XOR, OR, and NAND is given in Fig. 6 . It performs: addition for , XOR for , OR for and NAND for . Carry lookahead and skip carry ALUs can be trivially derived from the design of Fig. 6 by using the signals and as inputs to the carry lookahead or to the skip carry block. Fig. 7 presents the self-checking version of the ALU implementing the same functions.
• During the addition, all the signals take the same values as in the case of the self-checking adder.
• During logic operations, the control signals and adapt the propagate signal to implement the required function, that is, XOR for , OR for , and NAND for . In addition, during these operations, the signal forces to 0 the value of the carry input . Thus, the value of the propagate signal is transmitted to the output , implementing in this way the logic operations.
• For parity prediction purposes, the signal modifies the generate signals ( ) to implement the AND function during OR operation, and the OR function during NAND operation. During these operations, the signal forces to 0 the input of the Carry Generation block. Then, since we have also forced to 0, the values of the generate signals are propagated to the signals , . Since these signals are checked by the double-rail checker, the output F1 of this checker will implement the functions during OR operation, during NAND operation, and during addition. Therefore, the signal in Fig. 8 respectively implements the functions , , and during the addition, XOR, OR, and NAND operations, which are the parity prediction equations for ALUs [see Section III, (1)- (4)]. Note that in Fig. 8 , the value is used to force the signal F1 to 0, in order to perform correctly the parity prediction during XOR operation ( ). Note also that during the NAND operation, the Fig. 8 correctly computes the parity if the ALU has an even number of inputs (which is the usual case). If the length of the ALU is odd, then, one XOR gate controlled by the signal has to be added to invert the signal F1 during the NAND operation.
Finally, shift-left operation is often performed by ALUs. Since shift-left is equivalent to the multiplication by two, this operation is simply executed by applying the same data on both operands and performing addition. Thus, no particular care is required for this operation, the results are checked like for the addition.
Theorem 5: The ALU of Fig. 7 is fault secure for any single logic-fault affecting the carry generation module, the module generating the signal , the modules generating the duplicated signals , the NAND and XOR gates generating , the NOR gate . Since these signals feed all the ALU bit slices, a fault affecting one of these signals may involve multiple output errors that can escape detection by the parity code. To achieve the fault secure property for these faults, the signals , , and will be coded by a parity bit and will be checked by a parity checker (two XOR gates) placed at the end of the lines routing , , and . ii) Faults on the NAND gate controlled by . The error on the output of this gate is always propagated to . It may or may not be propagated to the check carry . If it is propagated to , the error is detected by the double-rail checker, since the normal carry is correct. If it is not propagated to , the error is detected by the parity prediction, since is erroneous but the predicted parity is correct (all normal and check carries are correct). iii) Faults affecting the line routing the signal . This fault can create multiple errors on the normal carries which can also be propagated on the check carries (common mode errors). However, if we consider the less significant erroneous carry, we note that its corresponding check carry is correct. Thus, the error is detected by the doublerail, checker.
Q.E.D.
VI. SELF-TESTING PROPERTY
A fault secure circuit guarantees that under a single fault all errors are detectable. Thus, the fault secure property is the most important property required in self-checking designs. This is also the most difficult property to achieve. Another useful property is the self-testing property. It stipulates that for each fault there is at least one input vector, occurring during the circuit normal operation that detects it. This property avoids the existence of redundant faults. Since such faults are undetectable they could be combined with new faults occurring later in the circuit, resulting in multiple faults that could destroy the fault secure property. So far, we have shown that the new designs are fault secure. The self-testing property requires that there are no redundancies in the design. Since adders and ALUs proposed in the literature are well-optimized circuits, no redundancies exist in these designs and the self-testing property holds true for all stuck-at faults. Such designs include ripple-carry adder and ALUs, but also carry lookahead and skip-carry blocks.
For the sake of completeness, note that ripple-carry adders and ALUs are easily testable circuits. In a very rich literature on C-testability, the interested reader can find various short-test patterns detecting all single stuck-at faults, and in some works all multiple stuck-at faults in ripple carry adders and ALUs (e.g., [13] - [15] ). Alike, universal test patterns detecting single and multiple stuck-at faults in skip-carry and carry lookahead circuits can be found in [16] .
VII. SELF-CHECKING DATA PATH DESIGN AND HARDWARE COST
The new self-checking adders and ALUs are fully compatible with a self checking datapath design based on the parity code and can be easily integrated in such datapaths. Fig. 9 shows the example of a bus-oriented datapath, including an adder/ALU section, a register file, and a shifter. It uses two buses for data transfer purposes. We remark that all blocks excepting the adder/ALU are checked by the parity code. In addition, a parity checker is placed on each bus to check the results of each block when they are transferred through the buses. Since the buses and the register file have a bit-slice structure without interactions between the slices, a fault on a slice will affect a single bit of the data. Thus, these blocks can be checked by the parity code. In addition, although some interactions exist between the bit slices of a shifter, single-position and multiple-position shifters can also achieve the fault secure property by means of the parity code (see, e.g., [17] ). Obviously, adding a parity bit to the buses and the register file involves low hardware overhead (e.g., 6 .25% for a 16-bits data length).
Hardware overhead is also low for the self-checking shifter. For instance, the hardware overhead for a 16-bits shifter performing rotation, arithmetic shift, and left and right logic shifts for any number of positions, is only 18% ( [17] ). The hardware overhead for the new adders and ALUs, evaluated on the basis of gates count, is presented in Tables I and II. It is interesting to compare this cost with the cost of other self-checking adder and ALU designs. Designs based on arithmetic codes will require two modulo-3 generators (one per input operand), one arithmetic code checker (to check the results), a modulo-3 adder (to add the check parts), and a parity generator to generate the parity bit required by the other datapath blocks (and eventually by the memory system). Most of these blocks are very complex resulting in a cost much higher than the duplication. The situation is worst if the arithmetic code is used for an ALU, since arithmetic code prediction in logic operations requires complex hardware. Berger code prediction adders and ALUs also require high-hardware cost. For instance, Berger code prediction [6] for -bit adders requires a -bit zeros counter (to compute the Berger code check symbol for the carries), plus two -bit adders (to add/subtract the -bit Berger code, check symbols of the input operands and of the carries). For an 8-bits adder, this requires 12 full adders (FA), and 3 half adders (HA). For a 16-bits adder, it requires 21 FA and 2 HA. In the case of ripple-carry adders, this cost is much higher than the duplication. In addition, a Berger code checker and a parity generator are needed. The latter is necessary in order to generate data that are compatible with the rest of the system, for which the lowest cost self checking implementation is based on parity. Thus, it is obvious that the existing fault secure scheme requiring the lower cost corresponds to the duplication. It duplicates the adder/ALU section and uses a double-rail checker to check the results. It also requires a parity generator as previously explained. Thanks to the solution presented in Section IV, the parity generator can be avoided. In fact, the technique developed in Section IV also allows a cost reduction for the duplication scheme.
In the following, we will compare the carry checking/parity prediction scheme with that improved version of the duplication scheme. The duplication scheme will require a 100% hardware overhead for duplicating the adder/ALU, plus a double-rail checker. To make the comparison easier, we will ignore the cost of the double-rail checker and only consider the cost for duplicating the adder (100% hardware overhead). Thus, in Tables I and II , where we present the hardware cost for the carry checking/parity prediction scheme, we also consider the hardware overhead of the adder/ALU alone (i.e., we ignore the cost of the double-rail checker). In these tables, we present the hardware cost first by considering the adder/ALU logic without including the adder/ALU input/output latches and then by including these latches. We observe that the overhead is drastically lower than the 100% required by the duplication and it can be as low as 12% (case of the 64-bits carry lookahead adder including the latches). Therefore, the new scheme offers a drastic improvement with respect to the other existing solutions. The overhead is much lower for the case of fast adders/ALUs in comparison with the ripple-carry ones. This is due to the fact that the new scheme avoids the duplication of the complex carry generation circuits used in the fast designs. This is a significant advantage for the new scheme, since ripple-carry adders/ALUs are rarely used due to their poor performance.
For ALUs our scheme requires much higher overhead than for adders, due to the complexity of parity prediction for logic operations. But it still requires much lower overhead than the duplication scheme, especially when we consider the whole ALU section including the latches (i.e., 39% for a 16-bits carry lookahead ALU).
The hardware overhead reduction, observed in Tables I and II  when we take into account the latches, is due to the fact that the hardware overhead for the latches is very low, corresponding to the addition of a latch for storing the parity bit (6,25% for 16-bits data length). This situation also illustrates the reduction of the total hardware overhead that can be obtained if the other datapath blocks such as the register files, buses, and shifter are considered. These blocks involve a very low overhead (addition of a parity bit) and will reduce the global hardware overhead, even after the consideration of the parity checkers (one per bus) and the double-rail checker included in the adder/ALU section. As a matter of fact, fault secure datapaths can be implemented with low hardware cost and represent a relevant solution for enhancing reliability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a new self-checking scheme for adders and ALUs. This scheme is valid for any ALU and adder design (e.g., ripple-carry, group carry-lookahead, full carry-lookahead, skip-carry, conditional sum). It combines double-rail checking of the carries and parity prediction for the outputs, to achieve the fault secure property. In principle, combining double-rail checking and parity prediction should result in high hardware cost. Three hardware-reduction techniques were developed to maintain this cost low. The first technique replaces by a single block the double-rail checker and the parity generator required in a trivial combination of the carry checking and the parity prediction schemes. The second avoids the duplication of complex blocks, such as the carry lookahead or the skip carry block, for performing carry checking. The third achieves that checking by using partial carry duplication. These techniques allow to achieve the TSC property by means of very low-hardware overhead (e.g., 13% for the 32-bits carry lookahead adder) and compares very favorably with respect to a 100% hardware overhead required by the duplication. Thus, the new scheme is shown to be more efficient than any other known scheme. It allows low cost implementation of self-checking datapaths and provides a very attractive solution for improving reliability.
